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Abstract
Understanding of the evolved biological function of NREM and slow wave sleep has advanced considerably in
the past decade. However, no equivalent understanding of REM sleep and dreams has emerged. Contemporary
neuroscientific theories generally view dreams as epiphenomena, and the few proposals for their biological function
are contradicted by the phenomenology of dreams themselves. Now, the recent advent of deep neural networks
(DNNs) has finally provided the novel conceptual framework within which to understand the evolved function of
dreams. Notably, all DNNs face the issue of overfitting as they learn, which is when performance on one data
set increases but the network’s performance fails to generalize (often measured by the divergence of performance on
training vs testing data sets). This ubiquitous problem in DNNs is often solved by experimenters via “noise injections”
in the form of noisy or corrupted inputs. The goal of this paper is to argue that the brain faces a similar challenge
of overfitting, and that nightly dreams evolved to combat the brain’s overfitting during its daily learning. That is,
dreams are a biological mechanism for increasing generalizability. Sleep loss, specifically dream loss, leads to an
overfitted brain that can still memorize and learn but fails to generalize appropriately. Herein this "overfitted brain
hypothesis" is explicitly developed and then compared and contrasted with existing contemporary neuroscientific
theories of dreams. Existing evidence for the hypothesis is surveyed within both neuroscience and deep learning, and
a set of testable predictions are put forward that can be pursued both in vivo and in silico.
1 Introduction
During the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020, many of those
in isolation reported an increase in the vividness and
frequency of their dreams (Weaver, 2020), even leading
#pandemicdreams to trend on Twitter. Yet dreaming is
so little understood there can be only speculative answers
to the why behind this widespread change in dream be-
havior. This is despite the fact that humans spend hours
every night dreaming and that dream deprivation is highly
damaging to animals (Albert et al., 1970); indeed, dream-
ing is homeostatically regulated in that there even ap-
pears to be a "dream drive" (Dement, 1960). Addition-
ally, dreaming is conserved across many species (Siegel,
1999), indicating an essential evolved purpose (Cirelli
and Tononi, 2008). Yet finding a biological function for
dreams themselves has evaded resolution. The "null the-
ory" that dreams and even sleep itself are adaptive only
in that they prevent organisms from moving during peri-
ods which they are not adapted to, such as ensuring that
diurnal animals are inactive during night, is still taken se-
riously (Siegel, 2011). This is despite the fact that around
50-70% of the time subjects report having a dream upon
a sudden waking during sleep, with more dreams being
reported later on in the night (Foulkes, 1962; Stickgold
et al., 2001b). Reports from those who keep regular dream
journals, or who spend time each morning recollecting
dreams, indicates that preserving a memory of dreams in-
creases significantly with practice (Robb, 2018). All this
hints that individuals may regularly underestimate how
much time they actually spending dreaming during sleep.
What is the purpose of strange state? The fact that
sleep overall has some relationship to learning was known
even by the roman orator Quintilian (Duff, 2014). Yet,
as will be discussed in detail in section 2, contemporary
neuroscientific theories which relate dreaming to mem-
ory storage, memory replay, or emotional processing,
still view dreams themselves as epiphenomena. And no
contemporary theory appropriately accounts for the phe-
nomenology of dreams and their sparse, hallucinatory,
and narrative contents.
This lack of viable theories about why animals dream
stands in contrast with how much is known about sleep
physiology and its stages (Lee and Dan, 2012). As origi-
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nally discovered by lesion studies and later supported by
genetic knockout studies, the sleep state is brought about
by a far-reaching set of subcortical neuromodulatory sys-
tems, with no one system being necessary, indicating re-
dundancy in how the waking state is sustained (Jones,
2005). In general this multifaceted arousal system is ex-
citatory during wake in that it has the greatest firing, and
becomes more quiescent to bring about sleep, although
this is not true for all such systems, especially those that
establish REM.
A classic signature of sleep are slow waves, which are
waves of activity that traverse the cortex, which can be
identified when the dominate frequency of EEG is less
than 1 Hz. In this state, the cortex become bistable, oscil-
lating between periods of intense firing and periods often
referred to as "down states" wherein neurons are silent. In
general it should be noted that there is a spectrum wherein
sometimes a brain region is experiencing slow wave sleep
and this is not synchronized with other regions (Nir et al.,
2011). This is despite the fact that sleep itself is tradi-
tionally broken down into NREM sleep and REM sleep,
with REM sleep being more associated with dreaming
than NREM sleep. Yet there is evidence that dreaming oc-
curs regularly throughout the night, across different sleep
stages (Oudiette et al., 2012), although it is rarest in the
"deepest" stage of NREM, stage 3, wherein surface EEG
reflects low-frequency cortical slow-waves. Recent neu-
roimaging and sudden-waking experiments have demon-
strated that all sleep stages can have dreams, which are the
result of localized wake-like firing (Siclari et al., 2017).
On average high-frequency EEG signals in posterior areas
of the brain were most correlated with reports on wak-
ing. Despite the ubiquity of dreams, it is still the case
that REM is most strongly associated with dreaming, over
80-90% of the time in some awakening studies, althought
it should be noted again that sleep involves a spectrum
wherein it is difficult to find any stage at any time of the
night that does not contain any dreams at all (Cipolli et al.,
2017). While early on in the night dreams can present
themselves as more "thought-like" and simple, later on in
the night, particularly during REM, dreams can become
incredibly complex with a fully-developed narrative struc-
ture (Siclari and Tononi, 2016).
As far as is currently known, dreaming of this lat-
ter sort is a brain-wide state where the brain is experi-
encing a single narrative or event, which is supported by
the activation of the default-mode network during dream-
ing (Domhoff, 2011). Consider, for instance, the evi-
dence from sudden-waking experiments that higher fre-
quency activity in the frontal lobe predicted emotional af-
fect within the subject’s dream (Sikka et al., 2019). Or
consider the evidence that during lucid dreaming activity
is similar to waking movements in the sensorimotor cor-
tex (Dresler et al., 2011).
Despite the nuances and redundancies of the cortical
systems in play, it still makes sense to view the change
from dreamless sleep to dreaming as occurring via a brain-
wide neuromodulatory system that regulates level of con-
sciousness, such as by the firing increase of acetylcholine-
containing neurons during REM. Neuromodulatory sys-
tems also create the conditions of muscle atonia during
dreaming, without which dreams can be acted out by the
body during sleep, a dangerous parasomnia called REM
sleep behavior disorder (Schenck and Mahowald, 2002).
What is the overall evolved purpose or function of
sleep? The evidence of distinct physiological states
brought about by neuromodulation suggests answering
this requires identifying multiple functions, particularly
for dreamless sleep vs. dreaming. Therefore, we should
expect dreams to play an important part in the evolved
role of sleep. Across the tree of life sleep as a whole is
highly conserved; most mammals spend somewhere be-
tween 4-20 hours sleeping (Joiner, 2016). There is even
evidence that C. elegans sleeps (Trojanowski and Raizen,
2016). In the past two decades there has been signifi-
cant progress when it comes to understanding the evolved
function of sleep as a whole, although this has not been
true for dreams themselves.
First, a novel discovery has led to a clear purpose
for at least one aspect of sleep. This was the discovery
of the brain’s gymphatic system, showing that sleep in-
volves the brain-wide flushing of metabolites with cere-
bral spinal fluid (Xie et al., 2013). This led to the the-
ory that sleep, especially during slow wave activity, had
the goal of waste clearance and this is at least partly be-
hind sleep’s restorative aspect. Glymphatic activity in the
form of this flushing is low in waking but high during
both sleep and anesthesia. In sleep and also in anesthe-
sia the greatest amount of flushing occurs during slow
wave sleep when low-frequency delta power dominates
the EEG (Hablitz et al., 2019), indicating that it may be
anti-correlated with dreaming, although this has not been
explicitly established.
Another important theory of the purpose of sleep is
the Synaptic Homeostasis Hypothesis (SHY) (Tononi and
Cirelli, 2003). According to SHY, daily learning leads to
net synaptic potentiation across the brain, which, if left
unchecked, would lead to a saturation of synaptic weight
and a cessation of learning (Tononi and Cirelli, 2006).
SHY hypothesizes that slow waves trigger a brain-wide
down-scaling of synaptic weights, thus ensuring that the
relative weights of synapses are kept proportional while
removing the risk of saturation. SHY has served as a
model neuroscientific theory in that it has generated a
number of new empirical findings (Bushey et al., 2011).
At the same time, it has also triggered fecund debate and
investigation (Frank, 2012). Again, SHY is more associ-
ated with slow wave sleep than with the high-frequencies
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that indicating dreaming.
The purpose of dreaming phase or aspect of sleep
lacks hypotheses as explicit and clear as those for slow
wave sleep. In order to offer forward a distinct theory of
the purpose of dreams, this paper outlines the idea that the
brains of animals are constantly in danger of overfitting,
which is the lack of generalizability that occurs in a deep
neural network when its learning is based too much on
one particular data set, and that dreams help mitigate this
ubiquitous issue. This is the Overfitted Brian Hypothesis
(OBH). The goal of this paper is to formally fill-out the
OBH by investigating the evidence that the brain fits to a
data set composed of the statistically self-similar daily ex-
periences of the organism, while nightly dreams improve
the generality of an animal’s representations, cognition,
and perceptual systems, by generating data far outside the
organism’s daily "training set" in a warped or corrupted
way (Hoel, 2019). As will be discussed, the OBH fits with
known biological understanding and data, matches better
with dream phenomenology than other theories, and addi-
tionally has roots in common practices in deep learning.
It makes unique predictions that can be tested both via
computational modeling and also in vivo.
2 Contemporary theories of dreams
A hypothesis for the evolved purpose of sleep must outline
a clear and distinct function from other aspects of sleep.
It must also explain how dreams present themselves, that
is, the phenomenology of dream experience. Specifically,
it must explain why dream phenomenology is different
than wake phenomenology. Consider three phenomeno-
logical properties unique to dreams. First, the sparseness
of dreams in that they are generally less vivid than wak-
ing life and contain less sensory and conceptual informa-
tion, i.e., less detail. Second, the hallucinatory quality of
dreams in that they are generally unusual in some way,
i.e., not the simple repetition of daily events or specific
memories. This includes the fact that in dreams events
and concepts often exist outside of normally strict cate-
gories (a person becomes another person, a house a space-
ship, etc). Third, the narrative property of dreams, in that
dreams in adult humans are generally sequences of events
ordered such that they form a narrative, albeit a fabulist
one. As we will see it is not in spite of these properties
that dreams serve their evolved purpose, but because of
them.
This section explores existent theories of dreams, the
supporting evidence (or lack thereof) and how they fail to
integrate well with, or explain, dream phenomenology.
2.1 Dreams are for emotional regulation
The idea that dreams are important for emotional health
is a descendant of Freudian theories of psycholanalysis
(Freud and Cronin, 2013). While Freud’s theories of
dreams as expressions of taboo frustration are discredited,
there is still a historical association between dreams as ex-
pressions of, or important for, emotional processing.
The specific proposals for how dreams impact emo-
tional regulation involve hypotheses like that dreams are
somehow for fear extinction (Levin and Nielsen, 2009).
Such hypotheses reason that dreams might act somewhat
like cognitive behavioral therapy treatment for phobias,
wherein they provide a safe space for "rehearsals" to-
ward fearful things in order to make them less frightful
(Scarpelli et al., 2019). Yet there is no evidence that the
fears of nightmares are the kind of irrational fears faced
by those with phobias, nor that fears toward nightmarish
events in general should be attenuated, as fear is evolu-
tionarily quite useful.
Another kind of theory is that dreams act as a kind
of "emotional thermostat" in order to regulate emotions
(Cartwright, 2005). From dream journals there is some
evidence that more emotional dreams predict better re-
covery from disorders like depression (Cartwright et al.,
2006), although sample size for this sort of research is
prohibitively small throughout oneirology. From neu-
roimaging there is evidence that emotional processing
centers like the amygdala show greater activity during
REM even than during wake (Hobson et al., 1998), al-
though the role of the amygdala ranges widely from emo-
tions to rewards to motivations (Janak and Tye, 2015).
There is some evidence that changes in REM sleep in-
dicate mood disorders (Kupfer, 1976). However, this
isn’t unique to only REM sleep, as NREM sleep is also
changed or reduced in mood disorders (Gillin et al., 1979),
and many cognitive disorders show sleep problems in gen-
eral (Peterson and Benca, 2006). Sleep deprivation does
appear to lead to emotional issues such as a lack of emo-
tional inhibition and also irritability (Gruber and Cassoff,
2014). But such failures of appropriate function holds true
across many cognitive processes following sleep depri-
vation, including executive function, which would affect
emotional regulation (Killgore, 2010).
Overall, the hypothesis that dreams are for resolving
emotional conflicts specifically does not have overwhelm-
ing empirical evidence. It is also not supported by the
phenomenology of dreams, which, at least in general, are
not intensely emotional. Indeed, neutral dreams are com-
mon. Overall there appears to be a bias to dreams in
that they are more likely to have negative affect (Mer-
ritt et al., 1994), although this may simply be that dreams
which have high emotional valence are memorable (and it
is worth noting that in studying dream reports joy/elation
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was the next most common to anxiety/fear). Given the ev-
idence it seems likely that whatever the evolved purpose
of dreams is, its function can affect emotions, but there
is no evidence that dreaming has evolved specifically for
emotional regulation.
2.2 Dreams are for memory consolidation
Perhaps the leading contemporary theory is that dreams
somehow involve memory consolidation and storage, of-
ten via a proposed form of memory replay (Wamsley,
2014). The dominant metaphor for this theory of con-
solidation is that of the computer: memories need to be
"stored" somewhere in the brain, like storing a computer
file on a hard drive, and therefore there must be a storage
process. This viewpoint is held by much of traditional
cognitive neuroscience, wherein the goal of the brain is
to "store" memories as veridically as possible (Marcus,
2009). The theory of memory consolidation is that this
storage process occurs during dreams, or alternatively
that dreams, by accessing previously stored memories,
strengthen them, or that somehow dreams are a byprod-
uct of integrating new memories with older ones.
There is a significant line of research that draws from
this theory, including many neuroimaging studies, and a
full review of the literature would be beyond the scope
of this paper (Vorster and Born, 2015). However, there
is also debate. Specifically the consolidation hypothe-
sis is both very broad and rarely meant to specify just
dreams rather than sleep in general (Siegel, 2001). For
example, there is evidence that learning a new task leads
to a greater activation during both REM (Maquet et al.,
2005) and slow wave sleep (Peigneux et al., 2004) in the
task-relevant cortical areas. This is true even when com-
paring a wake/sleep condition versus a control condition
without sleep but over the same time, which has found
that BOLD activity increased in associated brain regions
with the task (Debas et al., 2010). But these sorts of neu-
roimaging studies are not very specific, since increased
activation in relevant areas does not actually mean stor-
age, nor replay, nor integration with existing memories.
Indeed, they could be interpreted just as easily for evi-
dence of the OBH (see Section 3.1). A significant line
of direct evidence for the consolidation theory comes in
the form of "replay" of memories during sleep, a spe-
cific hypothesis with a clear thesis and standards of evi-
dence. Replay was originally discovered in the hippocam-
pus of rats (Wilson and McNaughton, 1994; Skaggs and
McNaughton, 1996), although the original analysis was
again for slow wave sleep, not dreaming specifically. In-
deed, the same statistically-increase in correlated neurons
that counts as "replay" occurs during quiet wakefulness,
indicating it has nothing specific to do with dreams (Kud-
rimoti et al., 1999). In general, if two neurons potentiate
at the same time and from the same cause, they are more
likely to be correlated in the sense of increased firing in
the future, regardless of whether they are replaying any-
thing specific, a view supported by the finding that "re-
play" events are much faster in terms of their firing (Eu-
ston et al., 2007).
There are a number of significant issues with the
specific hypotheses that dreams are replaying memories
(Wamsley, 2014). First, there is a lacking strong theoret-
ical argument as to why offline replay of episodic mem-
ories would assist memorization, rather than introducing
errors, since ground truth is absent offline. Indeed, neu-
roscience has shown that re-accessing memories gener-
ally changes them, rather than enforces them (Duvarci and
Nader, 2004).
Additionally, replay is unlikely to be the purpose
of dreams, since, as previously discussed, based on the
most detailed studies on dream reports after awakenings,
dreams are normally unconnected with the day’s events
(Nielsen and Stenstrom, 2005). Except in cases of PTSD,
dreams don’t repeat specific memories, and those that
do are considered pathological; for instance, closely af-
ter Hurricane Andrew, the only hurricane-related dreams,
even from a sample of the population from the hardest
hit area, were from those already diagnosed with PTSD
(David and Mellman, 1997). Overall, it appears that less
than 1-2% of dreams reports have anything to do with
episodic memories (Stickgold et al., 2001a). And this is
only when similarity is taken loosely (e.g., involving the
same people despite having totally different events occur,
or a task but much more hallucinatory or unrealistic). In-
deed, there is significant evidence that episodic memory
and dreams are dissociated (Fosse et al., 2003). While
there is behavioral evidence that repetitive daily tasks, like
having subjects play Tetris for significant periods of time,
can lead to Tetris-inspired dreams, such inculcated images
or sequences do not represent replay in that they are not
veridical repeats of previous games, being more halluci-
natory and sparse. Moreover, dreams triggered by such
repetitive games appear even in patients completely lack-
ing all memory, those with clinically diagnosed amnesia
(Stickgold et al., 2000). It can take several days for repet-
itive tasks to show up in dreams, a form of "dream lag,"
and almost always these tasks appear in partial forms that
are, again, only loosely similar (Blagrove et al., 2011).
Overall, the behavioral evidence suggests that dreams are
not replays of memories or waking events.
Additionally, well-controlled neuroimaging experi-
ments show little evidence for exact sequence replication
and strong evidence for mostly never-before-seen firing
patterns (Gupta et al., 2010). Therefore, there is a line
of evidence from Tetris-studies to sudden wake-ups to
dream-lag effects showing that partial or loosely-similar
dreams can be triggered most reliably by recently-learned
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tasks, and yet such inculcated dreams generally take the
form of never-before-seen experiences or sequences with
the traditional dream-like properties of sparseness and
hallucination, matching no specific memory but rather a
seeming exploration of the state-space of the task itself.
It is worth noting that in most cases the sparse, hal-
lucinatory, and narrative properties of dreams are unac-
counted for by the consolidation hypothesis. Most dreams
do not involve specific memories at all, making the in-
tegration of new memories a questionable purpose for
dreaming. Indeed, it is openly admitted that the consolida-
tion hypothesis still views dreams themselves as epiphe-
nomena (Wamsley, 2014). As we will see, much of the
supporting results for the integration, replay, or storage of
memories actually fits better with the OBH (Section 3.1).
2.3 Dreams are for selective forgetting
Notably, Francis Crick and his co-author proposed an al-
ternative purpose for dreams in 1983, which they called
"reverse learning" (Crick and Mitchison, 1983, 1995). In
this hypothesis the point of dreaming is somehow to re-
move "undesirable" connections and help the brain "un-
learn." Yet this hypothesis has been largely ignored in
contemporary dreaming research. Instead, the alternative
hypothesis, that dreams involve replay or consolidation
of memory, became favored by the community (Vertes,
2004) due to the excitement around early replay results
(Wilson and McNaughton, 1994). Contemporary neuro-
scientific research often views there as being both a con-
solidation phase as well as a forgetting phase for memo-
ries, although this is again predominately associated with
slow wave sleep, rather than dreaming specifically (Feld
and Born, 2017).
Recently there has been computational work in spik-
ing neural networks showing that in a specific model "re-
verse learning" can indeed prove helpful. Specifically,
authors showed that an anti-learning rule during a "sleep
phase" of the network, in the form of anti-Hebbian learn-
ing, could break up attractor states that were detrimental
to learning (Thiele et al., 2017). Therefore the idea of "re-
verse learning" is different from the OBH. It differs sig-
nificantly by focusing on how specific memories are de-
stroyed (via anti-learning mechanisms like a hypothetical
"reverse STDP") rather than how corrupted inputs or top-
down noise can improve generalization like in the OBH.
2.4 Dreams are preparations for real-world
problems
The close correlation between creativity and dreams, as
well as the similarity of dreams to simulations or vir-
tual realities, has lead to hypotheses that dreaming can
be used to solve relevant real-world problems for the ani-
mal. Perhaps the most direct statement of this is the idea
that dreams act as rehearsals for stereotypical behaviors
for animals in a form of "genetic programming" (Jou-
vet, 1998). In more contemporary studies this has been
referred to as the hypothesis that dreams act as proto-
conscious states to prepare for activities during waking
behavior (Hobson, 2009).
Similar examples of this hypothesis include an inter-
pretation based off of robots that used simulations to fig-
ure out self-models (Bongard et al., 2006) that an animal
might "dream up strategies for success" at night, like for
how to best climb obstacles, like rocks, that it faced during
the day (Adami, 2006). Evidence for this sort of hypothe-
sis is that there is a form of neural "pre-play" wherein the
sequences of activity predict future behavior of the ani-
mal (Dragoi and Tonegawa, 2011). However, in a similar
manner to the replay results, it is likely that most of the
time it is not the actual specific future sequences of activ-
ity, and that most sequences are never instantiated during
wake.
Perhaps the most general of these hypotheses of
dreams as simulations for solving real-world problems is
the idea that dreams are actually for refining the ability
to create simulations. This "InSim" hypothesis, which
specifically is a hypothesis about the dreams of young
children, posits that dreams are chances to create simula-
tions and then test their predictions against the real world
upon waking (Svensson and Thill, 2012). However, this
only applies to young children (with the assumption that
the few studies are correct that children’s dreams are more
"boring" than adults), since, as the authors themselves
point out, adult dreams would be consistently invalidated
by daily events. Indeed, the phenomenology of dreams
as sparse and hallucinatory and fabulist make it unlikely
that strategies or abilities or preparations that originate in
dreams work at all in the real world.
However, these types of theories are likely right to
view dreams as simulations. Yet according to the OBH the
purpose of these simulations is not to refine a particular
ability or strategy or plan of ac, or to which is what sim-
ulations normally are for. Instead the purpose is to pro-
vide "out-of-distribution" simulations specifically to pre-
vent overfitting and improve generalization, wherein over-
fitting is essentially an unavoidable issue brought about by
daily learning and therefore a constant threat to the brain’s
ability.
3 The overfitted brain hypothesis
As technology advances science often appropriates new
technologies for metaphors that help understand complex
systems (Lunteren, 2016). This has been particularly true
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of neuroscience (Daugman, 2001). In the past decade
it has become apparent that there are many lessons for
neuroscience to be taken from brain-inspired deep neu-
ral nets (DNNs), which offer a different framework for
thinking about learning than standard computer architec-
tures. DNNs are far and away the only successful analog
to human intelligence on complex tasks, and they tend to
develop brain-like connectivity and representational prop-
erties, like grid-cells, shape-tuning, and visual illusions
(Richards et al., 2019). One of the most significant dif-
ferences between DNNs and the brain is that updating of
synaptic weights in accordance with the backpropagation
of errors has traditionally been looked on as biologically
unrealistic. Yet new research reveals that the brain may
implement core features of backpropagation, with several
viable candidates such as node perturbations or neural
gradient representation by activity differences (Lillicrap
et al., 2020).
Therefore there is good reason for neuroscience to
look to deep learning for inspiration, since both are sys-
tems that perform complex tasks via the updating of
weights within an astronomically large parameter space.
It is clear that the challenges the brain and DNNs face
during learning and performance on complex tasks over-
lap significantly. Notably, one of the most ubiquitous
challenges DNNs face is a trade-off between generaliza-
tion and memorization, wherein as they learn to fit one
particular data set, they can become less generalizable to
others. This overfitting is identifiable when performance
on the training set begins to differentiate from perfor-
mance on the testing set. An omnipresent problem within
the deep learning community, solutions to overfitting in
DNNs most often comes in the form of a noise injection,
such as making input data sets corrupted and therefore less
self-similar (Maaten et al., 2013). Perhaps the most com-
mon explicit technique to prevent overfitting is dropout,
which is also fundamentally the injection of noise and
the corruption of input during learning (Srivastava et al.,
2014). Notably the more self-similar or biased your sam-
pling of training data is, the more overfitting will be an
issue.
The brain faces these challenges as it learns, since
what an organism experiences every day can be highly
self-similar and biased in its sampling of the environment.
The OBH states that dreams offer a biologically-realistic
"noise injection." Specifically, there is good evidence that
dreams are based on the stochastic percolation of signals
through the cortex, activating the default-mode network
(Domhoff and Fox, 2015). Note that there is growing ev-
idence that most of these signals originate in a top-down
manner (Nir and Tononi, 2010), meaning that the "cor-
rupted inputs" will bear statistical similarities to the mod-
els and representations of the brain. In other words, they
are derived from a stochastic exploration of the generative
model of the brain. This leads to the kind structured hallu-
cinations that are common during dreams. The hallucino-
genic, category-breaking, and fabulist quality of dreams
means they are extremely different from the "training set"
of the animal, i.e., their daily experiences. The diurnal cy-
cle of fitting to tasks during the day, and avoiding overfit-
ting at night via a semi-random walk of experiences, may
be viewed as a kind of "simulated annealing" (Kirkpatrick
et al., 1983) in the brain. That is, it is the very strangeness
of dreams in their divergence from waking experience that
gives them their biological function.
To sum up: the OBH conceptualizes dreams as a form
of purposefully corrupted input, likely derived from noise
injected into the generative model of the brain, the overall
purpose of which is to prevent overfitting. This overfit-
ting takes the form of both specific tasks that an organ-
ism might have learned but also generalization to out-of-
distribution (unseen) novel stimuli. As will be discussed,
the OBH fits well with the disparate known data about
dreams, such as their physiological origin in the form of
noise that creates "corrupted features" via neuromodula-
tory influences, their role in learning, and their impor-
tance for problem solving and creativity. However, most
importantly, it does not consider dreams as epiphenom-
ena generated by some background process, and it also
accounts for the actual phenomenology of dreams them-
selves. Their sparseness comes from the "dropout" of
bottom-up inputs and use of sparser or more local activity,
their hallucinatory nature comes from the stochastic na-
ture of their purposeful corrupted or warped nature away
from the daily "training set" the organism normally ex-
periences, and their narrative nature from the top-down
genesis of dreams since the brain understands reality in
the form of stories. That is, the distinct phenomenol-
ogy of dreams is to maximize their effectiveness at im-
proving generalization. The evidence for the OBH, as
well as more details about its distinguishing claims, are
overviewed in the following section.
3.1 Evidence from neuroscience
What is the evidence for the OBH from traditional meth-
ods of neuroscience? It is worth focusing not on all the
studies available, but those that distinguish the OBH from
the theory that dreams are correlated (in some unspecified
way) with learning.
In human behavioral experiments there is good sup-
porting evidence for the OBH specifically. First, the most
effective means of triggering dreams that contain partial
similarities to real-life events is through repetitive over-
training on a task. Examples of this include extensive
playing of games like Tetris (Stickgold et al., 2000) or
ski-simulators (Wamsley and Stickgold, 2010), which led
to dreams involving the learned task, although not specific
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repetitions or replays of memories. Put another way: the
surest way to trigger dreams about a real-world event is
to perform a task repetitively during the day, preferably
one that is novel. This creates the condition of the brain
being overfitted to the task, which then triggers nightly
dreams attempting to generalize performance on the task.
Evidence of dreaming about tasks specifically improving
those tasks is true of things like mirror tracing (Schredl
and Erlacher, 2010) and reading with inverted goggles on
(De Koninck et al., 1996). Even driving cars seems cor-
related to dreams about driving (Schredl and Hofmann,
2003). It is likely therefore there is a homeostatic compo-
nent to the OBH wherein different modules, processes, or
systems within the brain become overfitted from usage,
which are then most likely to trigger dreams involving
those modules. If so, neurons involved in recent learn-
ing would be most affected by overfitting. In this way
the OBH can account for many of the statistical "replay"
results since those neurons that saw synaptic changes in
response learning are most affected by the regularization
of dreaming. But the OBH further explains why exact
sequence replication is rare and most "replay" is actually
never-before-seen firing patterns (Gupta et al., 2010).
Another line of evidence for the OBH is that in hu-
mans there is evidence of task-dependency when it comes
to whether sleep improves learning. For adult humans per-
ceptual tasks showed little to no learning increase from
sleep wherein cognitive tasks showed significant gains
from learning (Doyon et al., 2009). Since it is likely that
adult humans already have well-fitted perceptual mod-
els, we should expect complex cognitive tasks to trigger
more gain from an increase in generalizability. While
dream reports are actually less common in young chil-
dren, particularly below the age of 7, from what can be
gleaned children’s dreams are much more static and per-
ceptual, focusing on individual scenes rather than full nar-
ratives (Foulkes, 2009). Meanwhile newborns exhibit "ac-
tive sleep," their version of REM, for 50% of their 16-18
hours of daily sleep, perhaps indicating that early percep-
tual models are in constant danger of overfitting.
The OBH is also supported by evidence that sleep
does not simply improve memory directly, but affects
some aspects of memory more than others. For instance,
in a word association test, direct associations, the equiva-
lent of pure memorization, did not benefit that much from
a night’s sleep. However, word associations were better
able to resist interfering associations (Ellenbogen et al.,
2006) indicating again that memorization is least affected
by sleep, but generalized performance is most affected.
This holds true even in babies, wherein sleep is corre-
lated with increased generalization and abstraction abil-
ities (Friedrich et al., 2015; Gómez et al., 2006).
Additionally, there is evidence from behavioral stud-
ies that over-training on a texture-discrimination task
leads to decreased performance on it, and that sleep
specifically, above and beyond the passage of time, res-
cues this performance (Mednick et al., 2002). This fits
with anecdotal reports of plateauing in terms of perfor-
mance on a task, like a video game, only to sleep and have
an increased performance the next day.
There is also the long-standing traditional association
between dreams and creativity, a rich literature. What are
often anecdotal reports are supported by careful studies
of how sleep improves abstraction and reasoning on tasks
(Wagner et al., 2004; Cai et al., 2009). This fits directly
with the OBH, since an increase in generalization would
directly lead to more insights in complex problems, or bet-
ter performance on cognitive tasks that require creativity.
Indeed, it explains the link between creativity and dream-
ing better than the hypotheses that dreaming is for the in-
tegration of new with old memories, the replay of memo-
ries, or their storage.
Finally, it might be argued that it is a problem for
the OBH that dreams are generally amnesiac, with ex-
plicit memory a rarity during dreams. Would it not be
strange then that the content of dreams have any effect
on the abilities of a neural network? Here, an impor-
tant distinction should be made between accessing explicit
declarative memories and the general fact that learning in-
volves changes to synapses. For instance, the amnesiac
effect during sleep may due to prefrontal inhibition. Just
as prefrontal cortex inhibition means that dreams are not
recognizable as dreams when they are occurring, it may
be that the same inhibition makes it difficult to recall in
the sense of cognitive access (Siclari and Tononi, 2016).
Anecdotal evidence from those with dream journals sug-
gests that paying attention to dreams makes them easier
to remember, lending credence to this hypothesis (Robb,
2018). Additionally, sudden-waking experiments show
that dream content is common and recallable. Likely the
effects of not being able to either form or access episodic
memories of all dreams at the end of the night are due to
the neuromodulatory milieu during sleep.
Supporting the OBH is evidence indicating that
dreams lead to synaptic changes in the connectivity of the
brain, albeit likely this is not as strongly as waking experi-
ence, with episodic memory storage significantly reduced.
What is the evidence that synapses change during sleep?
Proponents of SHY have argued that there is evidence
that synapses change during sleep in the form of synap-
tic homeostasis, regularization which occurs every night
in the form of universal down-scaling of synaptic strength
(Bushey et al., 2011). However, this has been challenged
by the observation of potentiation during sleep (Durkin
and Aton, 2016). In general it appears that whether there
is net potentiation or depression during waking depends
on the task (Fisher et al., 2016), indicating that learning
involves synaptic plasticity in both directions in both wake
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and sleep (Raven et al., 2018). If during dreams synapses
are indeed still plastic, then dreams can leave a synaptic
trace that can affect performance.
3.2 Evidence from deep learning
One of the most significant, and ubiquitous, challenges
any deep neural network faces is the ability to general-
ize beyond the data set it has been trained on. There
has been significant effort in the past decade by the deep
learning community to develop methods and techniques to
avoid overfitting on particular data sets and, at the broad-
est level, to allow for extrapolation to never-before-seen
data sets. This section overviews three commonly used
such techniques within deep learning (and research into
artificial neural networks generally). Notably, each em-
bodies some phenomenological property of dreams.
First, there is the method of dropout, perhaps the most
widely-used technique for preventing overfitting in deep
learning (Achille and Soatto, 2018). Dropout occurs dur-
ing the training of a network, when inputs are made sparse
by randomly "dropping out" some of them, a form of regu-
larization during learning which is mathematically similar
to a noise injection (Srivastava et al., 2014). It is important
to note that dreams resemble dropout in their spareness,
as they do not contain as much perceptual information, or
details in general, as waking experiences. This likely in-
creases the salience of relevant features while minimizing
irrelevant features, assisting in generalization by making
representations more robust and invariant. Dreams are a
lesser or weakened state of conscious experience because
of this dropping out of bottom-up stimuli, lacking much
of the detail of waking conscious experiences, which, ac-
cording to the OBH actually assists, rather than hinders,
their function.
Second, there is the method of domain randomization
used in training deep neural networks. In domain ran-
domization, the inputs during learning are "randomized"
in the sense of being warped or corrupted in particular
ways. This can drastically assist with learning and gener-
alization. Paradoxically, simulating hallucinatory inputs
rather than learning off of real inputs helps deep neural
networks learn real-world tasks (Tobin et al., 2017). Do-
main randomization has have been used in cutting-edge
techniques in deep learning, such as being necessary for
having a DNN solve a Rubik’s Cube using a robot hand
(Akkaya et al., 2019). Domain randomization resembles
the hallucinatory quality of dreams in that dreams de-
part significantly from normal experiences, as if they have
been randomly drawn from a varied set of different do-
mains.
Of course, the implementation of these techniques
must be different for the brain. This is because the brain
faces many challenges that artificial neural networks do
not. Any organism that implemented dropout or domain
randomization during its daily learning would face serious
survival issues. Therefore, in order to increase generality
and avoid overfitting a dedicated offline period is needed.
Sleep, possibly having originally evolved for other house-
keeping reasons, is the perfect time.
The third common practice in deep learning that has
ties to dreaming is the use of fully simulated data via some
generative model. A generative model is when a neural
network is trained on data from a domain to output gener-
ated data that looks as if it came from the domain but that
the network itself generates. Generative models lie behind
the success of generative adversarial networks (GANs)
and other techniques that allow for cutting-edge perfor-
mance on complex tasks using sets of feedforward net-
works that anticipate the other’s output (Goodfellow et al.,
2014). It is worth noting that GANs and others often pro-
duce notoriously dream-like fabulist outputs (Hertzmann,
2019). Indeed, recently an external generative model that
created "dream-like" input helped train a DNN to pro-
duce the code behind a given mathematical mapping (Ellis
et al., 2020). It should be noted that in all these cases the
generative model exists outside the network itself, which
is not biologically realistic in the case of the brain.
But what about cases where the network itself acts the
generative model? In networks that are not purely feed-
foward or have external models that can be manipulated
by experimenters, the stimulation of higher layers (gener-
ally through the injection of noise) can lead to patterns of
activity in the lower layers that recapitulate the statistical
properties of inputs, as if the network were being stimu-
lated from the bottom-up from imaginary sources. This
is likely the case in the brain, wherein stochastic activity
high in the hierarchy of brain regions creates hallucinatory
patterns of inputs. It is worth noting that the proposal of
a "wake/sleep" specific algorithm for unsupervised learn-
ing of generative models based on feedback from stochas-
tic stimulation goes back 25 years (Hinton et al., 1995).
While there have even been suggestions that the purpose
of sleep involves the "wake/sleep" algorithm itself (Se-
jnowski, 1995), this algorithm is only for a form of un-
supervised learning that creates a generative model and
requires several assumptions that are not biologically re-
alistic, like only training one set of connections at a time.
It is also clear the brain does much more than just learn a
lone generative model.
However, it is likely the case that dreams are indeed a
result of the brain’s internal generative model in the form
of its feedback connectivity, which fits with the evidence
that dreams are "top-down" (Foulkes and Domhoff, 2014).
If dreams are from a similar top-down generative model
composed of feedback connectivity, this fits with evidence
that dreaming drawn from the brain’s generative model
becomes more narrative and complex over time, particu-
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larly during adolescence (Strauch, 2005). By adulthood,
dreams take on the narrative structure of human cognition
wherein stories and metaphors make up the core function
of thought (Lakoff and Johnson, 2008). Since narratives
are the way by which human brains understand the world
(Lakoff, 2008), the generative model of the brain produces
narratives, which act as hallucinatory and sparse "fake" in-
put for learning, thus combating overfitting and improving
generalization. In this way they are a direct expansion of
the normal "training set" of an animal, since narratives are
how conscious perception itself proceeds (James, 2007).
Overall, while there is no one exact method in deep
learning that matches precisely with the OBH, overlap-
ping aspects of common methods in the field for mitigat-
ing overfitting and assisting generalization lend credence
to the idea that the evolved function of dreaming is for
precisely these purposes.
4 Predictions
The OBH puts together several lines of investigation un-
der one roof by being explicit about asking how general-
ization during learning can benefit from dreams. This in-
volves understanding how dreams can help overcome an
organism’s reliance on just the day’s events, which are of-
ten highly statistically biased. The theory makes a number
of specific predictions which can be pursued both experi-
mentally as well as theoretically.
4.1 Experimental validation
Experimental investigation of the OBH within neuro-
science can consist of several components. Under the
OBH, much of the benefit of dreaming is in the realm
of generalizability not memorization per se, and this can
be differentiated with well-designed behavioral tests. For
example, it may be that direct measurement of overfitting
is possible in humans. This may include the training of
subjects on overly repetitious tasks in order to ensure the
condition of overfitting. It may also include using sim-
ilar techniques as those within deep learning to test for
generalization of performance. Beyond behavioral pre-
dictions and subsequent studies, there is also the possibil-
ity of attempting to track synaptic plasticity in response to
dreams. This may include things like tracking changes in
dendritic spine morphology during REM.
Notably, the sort of cognitive flexibility and general-
ization the OBH claims is the purpose of dreams is highly
important for workers and those in the armed forces who
sometimes operate under sleep deprivation during critical
periods, which can lead to increased accident rates (Pow-
ell and Copping, 2010), and has a significant monetary an-
nual impact (Leger, 1994). If it is true that sleep-deprived
brains are overfitted, they will be prone to make errors in
stereotypical ways. Thus it may be easier to know what
types of mistakes will be made by individuals operating
in sleep-deprived states and in response build more robust
fail-safes. Furthermore, there is the possibility of dream
substitutions: dream-like stimuli that are artificially gen-
erated to have the properties of dreams, and therefore have
a similar ameliorative effect on overfitting. Such dream
substitutions, delivered via VR or even video, might pro-
vide a simple yet effective mean for delaying some of
sleep deprivation’s cognitive defects. The impact of sub-
stitutions can be examined both behaviorally but also at
the neurophysiological level of REM rebound (Ocampo-
Garcés et al., 2000).
4.2 Theoretical validation
The OBH has consequences not just for neuroscience, but
also for the field of deep learning. This is particularly
true of biologically-realistic models, like large-scale tha-
lamocortical spiking-neuron models, which have previ-
ously been used to investigate the development of corti-
cal connectivity and its effect on slow waves (Hoel et al.,
2016). It is likely that biologically-realistic spiking neu-
rons which are still trainable in the manner of DNNs
(Hazan et al., 2018) can be used to explore the benefits
of dreams directly. In such a cortical model, neuromodu-
lation can be used to be intersperse training with periods
that mimic sleep stages, cycling first through the real in-
put of its training set, and then hallucinatory corrupted in-
put generated from its top-down connections. This should
prevent or delay overfitting.
What sort of stochastic biases allow for dreams to
warp input data in a way that is most efficient for avoiding
overfitting? If the OBH is correct, then the sparse and hal-
lucinatory nature of dreams suggest that we should expect
warping of input distributions that successfully combats
overfitting has these qualities. Such distributions should
be sparse in that they have less entries than normal in-
puts, and hallucinatory in that they should be clustered in
a different way compared to the standard "daily" input.
It may be that investigating these questions could lead
to methods useful for the field of deep learning itself, par-
ticularly those that are more biologically-realistic in their
operations. For instance, as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, it may be hypothesized that phases of dream-like
confabulation in DNNs to increase generalization and pre-
vent overfitting will work most effectively with a using
lower learning rate than normal training, since this mim-
ics the semi-amnesiac effect of dreams.
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5 Discussion
The Overfitted Brain Hypothesis (OBH) posits the
evolved purpose of dreams is to assist generalization,
mainly by combating the highly biased nature of inputs
during an animal’s daily learning that can lead to overfit-
ting. It is supported by both empirical evidence (Section
3.1) and theoretical evidence (Section 3.2). In many cases
it can explain observed results better than other hypothe-
ses (comparative hypotheses are discussed in Section 2).
For example, it seems the most effective way to trigger
dreams about something is to have subjects perform on a
novel task like Tetris repetitiously (Stickgold et al., 2001a;
Wamsley and Stickgold, 2010), likely because the visual
system has became overfitted to the task. Additionally,
the OBH explains why "replay" results more often con-
tain never-before-see patterns of activity than actual re-
plays of waking sequences (Gupta et al., 2010). In another
example, it explains the fact that synaptic potentiation oc-
curs during sleep (Durkin and Aton, 2016), indicating that
learning during dreams themselves leaves behind a synap-
tic trace.
The OBH does not necessarily contradict other hy-
potheses about sleep, for instance, the idea that dur-
ing certain periods of sleep there is ongoing metabolic
waste clearance (Xie et al., 2013). In this sense then
the OBH speculates that dreaming evolved as an exap-
tation, wherein sleep evolved for molecular housekeeping
purposes and only when brains had to significantly learn
during the organism’s lifetime did the goal of avoiding
overfitting and increasing generalization become adap-
tive. Additionally, it does not compete with other func-
tional hypotheses about dreams, which may be accom-
plished at the same time. For instance, it may be that
dreams are also a test-bed for strengthening the brain’s
generative model and therefore ability to generate men-
tal imagery during wake, explaining the complexification
of dreams from childhood to adulthood (Foulkes, 2009).
So there may be multiple functions to dreams at differ-
ent timescales. It is also worth noting that dream’s role
in improving generalization might also be combating re-
lated things like "catastrophic forgetting," which is a prob-
lem faced by DNNs that try to train on multiple tasks,
and which can also be prevented or alleviated by methods
like dropout or more complicated techniques like elastic
weight consolidation (Kirkpatrick et al., 2017). Recent
research shows that stimuli created from a network’s gen-
erative model (which are, according to the OBH, similar
to dreams), can indeed help avoid catastrophic forgetting
(Raghavan et al., 2019). So while issues like catastrophic
forgetting (the complete unlearning of a task while learn-
ing another) is not well documented in humans, it may
be that the brain faces some lesser form of it, and dreams
can be conceptualized as a form of regularization that may
ameliorate several aspects of common learning failures si-
multaneously.
Perhaps the most distinguishing aspect of the OBH
is that it takes the phenomenology of dreams seriously,
in that they are sparse, hallucinogenic, and narrative in
the sense of containing fabulist and unusual events. The
OBH emphasizes that it is precisely because of the de-
parture from waking life that dreams evolved. According
to this hypothesis dreams are not epiphenomena, either
in the sense of neutral evolution but also in the sense of
not being an expression of some other background pro-
cess, such as patterns of activity and associated experi-
ences merely brought about by some other processing in-
tegrating new memories (Wamsley, 2014). Rather, the
point of dreams is the dreams themselves, since they pro-
vide departures away from the statistically-biased input
of an animal’s daily life, which can assist with generaliza-
tion and therefore performance. It may seem paradoxical,
but a dream of flying may actually help you keep your
balance running. The evidence for this possibility comes
from common methods in deep learning which improve
generalization, such as dropout (Srivastava et al., 2014),
domain randomization (Tobin et al., 2017), and the use of
input data created by stochastic stimulation of generative
models (Ellis et al., 2020), which together bear striking
similarities to the properties of dreams.
The OBH makes several predictions that are useful for
both the field of neuroscience and the field of deep learn-
ing. These include predictions on the neurophysiologi-
cal level, as well as behavioral, and even within the field
of deep learning. For instance, the prediction that inputs
with dream-like properties, i.e., adhering to dream phe-
nomenology, will assist with overfitting in DNNs. Be-
haviorally, overfitting might be induced in subjects via
through repetitive training on an under-sampled task, and
the benefit of dreaming might be directly measured. There
is also the possibility of dream substitutions, wherein ar-
tificial dream-like stimuli might help improve generaliza-
tion and therefore performance in sleep-deprived individ-
uals.
Finally, it is worth taking the idea of dream substitu-
tions seriously enough to consider whether fictions, like
novels or films, act as artificial dreams, accomplishing at
least some of the same function. Within evolutionary psy-
chology, the attempt to ground aspects of human behavior
in evolutionary theory, there has been long-standing con-
fusion with regard to human interest in fictions, since on
their surface fictions have no utility. They are, after all,
explicitly false information. Therefore it has been thought
that fictions are either demonstrations of cognitive fitness
in order to influence mate choice (Hogh-Olesen, 2018), or
can simply be reduced to the equivalent of "cheesecake"
— gratifying to consume but without benefit. Proponents
of this view have even gone so far as to describe the arts
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as a "pleasure technology" (Pinker, 1997). However, the
OBH suggests fictions, and perhaps the arts in general,
may actually have an underlying cognitive utility in the
form of improving generalization and preventing overfit-
ting, since they act as artificial dreams.
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